Following changes in 2019 in the Solvency II directive, EIOPA has the power to set up and coordinate collaboration platforms to enhance collaboration between the relevant supervisory authorities where a (re)insurance undertaking carries out, or intends to carry out, cross-border activities based on the freedom to provide services or the freedom of establishment. For these platforms, the criterium is not significant cross-border activity from the point of view of the home supervisor, but relevance to the host Member State market. Around ten of these platforms have been set up since then. However, in several cases, according to the European Commission, supervisors have failed to reach a common view on how to address issues related to such cross-border business. Hence, the European Commission proposes to further enhance EIOPA’s role: the home supervisor must inform EIOPA and the relevant host supervisors if it identifies deteriorating financial conditions or other emerging risks which may have a cross-border effect. The host supervisor may notify EIOPA and the home supervisor if it has serious consumer protection concerns. The idea is to find a bilateral solution between home and host supervisors while EIOPA stands ready on the side Will that work? This is part two of Lieve Lowet’s latest blog on Solvency II (see related items for part 1). Continue reading…

Since the introduction of Solvency II, there have been very few failures in the insurance sector. Because some failures had cross-border consequences, there has been pressure to change the present regulatory regime in order to give more powers to host supervisors and to EIOPA. Although the functioning of the internal market in insurance can certainly be improved, care must be taken not to overload the barge and to respect the approach that was agreed in the nineties for all financial service operators, i.e. a single market with a single license (European passport) and home country control. Failures are in a way a proof that market mechanisms are working. But in the financial services area, failures are more undesirable than in the rest of the services sector, especially in a cross-border context exercised via the freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide services (FPS). Despite the fact that Solvency II was not conceived as a zero-failure regime and that few failures have occurred in practice, the European Commission, pushed by EIOPA, is proposing important amendments to the present regime for insurers that operate cross-border, justified by supervisory shortcomings and a varying degree of policyholder protection across the EU following these failures. This is part one of Lieve Lowet’s latest blog posts on Solvency II. Part 2 will be published this Wednesday. Continue reading…

While all eyes are focused on the Commission’s proposal for a directive amending the Solvency II directive (SII) as regards proportionality, quality of supervision, reporting, long-term guarantee measures, macro-prudential tools, sustainability risk and cross-border supervision, the Commission proposed also on 22 September a second proposal for directive. This second proposal aims to establish a new framework for the recovery and resolution of (re)insurance undertakings (hereafter IRRD). Continue reading…

On 23 July 2021, EIOPA issued a consultation on a potential new supervisory statement, focusing this time on the supervision of run-off undertakings. The aim of any supervisory statement is to ensure the application of high-quality and convergent supervision. Run-off undertakings or portfolios are unabridged subject to the Solvency II (SII) prudential framework in which no specific provisions are foreseen for these “insurance undertakings”. In a dynamic and competitive European insurance market where it should be possible for players to come and go, a clear framework for run-off undertakings seems logical. In addition, there is an increasing interest in the acquisitions of run-off portfolios and run-off undertakings by other insurance undertakings and specialised investment entities such as private equity. Therefore, one could argue that, because the SII framework is lacking a specific regulation, this void needs to be filled. Does this mean that the proportionality principle is not specific enough to deal with particularities of nature, size and complexity?  Continue reading…